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The ideal of the builders of the 19th century nation states, the idea of ’one state – one na-
tion’ has not come into existence in hardly any of the European states despite the ethnic 
cleansings, forced migrations, forced assimilation and partly as a result of the mass appear-
ance of immigrants (e.g. “Gastarbeiter/guest workers”, refugees). From among the present 
703 million inhabitants of our continent, members of titular nations of the individual 
countries constitute only 85%, historic national and ethnic minorities constitute 10%, 
while the remaining 5% are immigrants with no citizenship. According to census data, 
from among the European states (except for the micro states) Poland, Portugal, Hungary, 
the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Norway are the closest to the above mentioned 
nation state homogeneity, where more than 93% of the population count as members 
of the titular nation. From an ethnic-linguistic perspective (except for Belgium, Bosnia, 
Cyprus and Switzerland, as well as the micro states that all have unique ethnic-political 
backgrounds) the most heterogeneous ones are Spain, Latvia and Macedonia, since in 
their case the joint proportion of minorities exceed one third of the population.
Due to this significant and in some cases increasing ethnic-linguistic diversity, the 
fading of the memories of the second world war and the dissolution of the former Com-
munist federal states the number and intensity of the ethnic conflicts within the states 
has increased since the 1960s. In the background of the conflicts a rigid rejection of the 
collective rights of minorities (including those related to autonomy) and, as a result, the 
secessionist ambitions of the minorities could be observed in most of the cases. Follow-
ing the civil wars on the territories of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the 
1990s, efforts were made to settle such conflicts peacefully, via negotiations, moreover, 
in the case of certain western nation states that had earlier been strictly centralised, de-
centralization, and a movement towards regional self-governance could be observed.1 
From among the states possessing solid democratic traditions, acknowledging territori-
al and cultural heterogeneity seeking to avoid conflict, primarily Italy, Spain, Belgium 
and the United Kingdom pursued the deepening of the various forms of regional pow-
er-sharing, the most common one of which, along with the system of federal and asso-
ciated statehood, is autonomy. Autonomy can be of non-ethnic (regional territorial) 
and of ethnic nature. The status of Spain and that of some Italian autonomous regions 
1  Benedikter, T.: The World’s Modern Autonomy Systems. Concepts and Experiences of Regional Territorial Autonomy. 
Bolzano: Institute of Minority Rights EURAC Research. 2009.
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not populated by minorities (e.g. Andalusia, Madrid, Sicily) stand as examples for the 
former one. The latter, the ethnic based autonomy (if ethnic-geographical conditions 
are met) may be territorial (e.g. South Tyrol, Åland Islands, Catalonia, Tatarstan) or 
local (administrative) and personal (cultural).2 
“A territorial autonomy is a geographically defined area, which differs from other 
sub-regions (like municipalities, federal states, etc.) in a specific country and has re-
ceived special status with legislative and/or regulatory (administrative) powers”.3 In the 
past such form of autonomy was considered to be the first step towards separation, a 
means to disintegrate existing states.4 Today, based on positive international experienc-
es, we believe that territorial autonomy is the most developed asset of minority protec-
tion and the most modern form of internal self-governance, which can be considered as 
a compromise between the given state (the titular nation) and the national minorities, 
which ensures autonomy – a fundamental human right – to the minorities and ensures 
the preservation of the territorial integrity and the intangibility of the borders to the 
state.
In order to preserve the state’s territorial integrity and to grant the minority collec-
tive rights (voluntarily or under compulsion), territorial autonomies have so far been 
realised in Europe primarily on Scandinavian, Italian, Spanish and British territories 
and in Russia (Figure 15). It is conspicuous, however, that on the territory of France, the 
ideal of the strongly centralised nation states, and on the territories of the ex-commu-
2  Benedikter, T.: The World’s Modern Autonomy Systems, op. cit.
3  Ackrén, M.: Conditions for Different Autonomy Regimes in the World. Åb: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2009. 20.
4  Pan, C. and Pfeil, B.S.: National Minorities in Europe: Handbook, Vol. 1. Vienna: Braumüller ETHNOS. 2003
5  Fig.1. Existing and geographically possible ethnic based territorial autonomies in Europe
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nist East-Central and South-Eastern European countries, such autonomies – because 
of the fear of the suspected secessionist endeavours of the minorities – could not be 
realised. 
As shown by international experiences, an ethnic based territorial autonomy (dis-
regarding the political conditions this time and concentrating on a pure ethnic-geo-
graphical aspect) can only be successful, where the ethnic area of the given minority 
is (more or less) contiguous and where the ethnic minority constitutes the absolute 
(demographic) majority (that is in the area the members of the titular nation represent 
a demographic minority). From this respect, in France Alsace (German speaking Alsa-
tians), Lower Brittany (Bretons), the Northern Basque Country, Northern Catalonia/
Roussillon and Corsica should have this form of self-governance. The same is true for 
some minorities living in the ex-communist countries (e.g. Poles in the joint border are-
as of Lithuania and Belarus, Turks in Bulgaria, Bulgarians in Serbia and in the Ukraine, 
Serbs in Northern Kosovo, Bosniaks/Muslims in the Serbian Sandjak area, and the 
Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin).
Historical roots of the territorial autonomies in the Carpathian Basin
The Carpathian Basin, accommodating almost 29 million inhabitants, has a situation 
similar to the European average, since 84% of its inhabitants are members of the indi-
vidual titular nation. From among the other inhabitants who count fundamentally as na-
tional-ethnic minorities, due to state borders drawn after the two world wars and due to 
migration processes, it is only the Hungarian minority (to be more precise, only two third 
of them) who possesses a settlement area which meets the prerequisites of a territorial 
autonomy. All other minorities basically fight for survival on linguistic islands and in di-
asporas, where the only possibility is to realise local or cultural autonomy.
The period before 1918
It is a little-known fact that the Carpathian Basin can be called the cradle of European 
territorial autonomies, where the individual regions and ethnic groups had a large scope 
of autonomy until the middle of the 19th century.
In the Carpathian Basin, Croatia – which had become part of the Hungarian King-
dom between 1091 and 1097 as a result of the military campaigns led by the Hun-
garian kings Saint Ladislaus I and Coloman I – had the longest (lasting almost 800 
years) regional territorial self-governance, which preserved its territorial separatism, its 
self-governance in the form of a personal union as regulated by the pact of 1102 (Pacta 
conventa) between King Coloman and the Croatian aristocracy during the existence of 
the Hungarian-Croatian state. This territorial separatism and self-governance were also 
represented by the ban (viceroy) of Croatia-Dalmatia and Slavonia and their national 
assembly (sabor). Slavonia (Hung. Tótország, Szlavónország) between the Drava river 
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and the Dinaric Ranges permanently became a part of Hungary at the beginning of the 
11th century and the foundation of the diocese of Zagreb by Saint Ladislaus I in 1091, 
and was ruled as a duchy by heirs to the throne and other members of the royal family 
or the bans of Slavonia from the 12th century (Figure 26). 
The different degrees of autonomies of Croatia and Slavonia decreased significantly 
after 1526 under the Habsburg rule and their territories were reduced to approximately 
to one third of their original size after the Ottoman (Turkish) invasion. Consequently 
and as a result of the large-scale migration the centre of the Croatian statehood (and the 
notion of Croatia) was pushed from the seaside to the northern, Slavonian territories 
near Zagreb, while the notion of Slavonia was pushed towards the east, to the territories 
between the Drava and Sava rivers, reconquered from the Ottoman Empire between 
1684 and 1688.7 After 1790 Slavonia is mentioned together with Croatia, as one of its 
parts. During the Hungarian revolution and war of independence in 1848, the consti-
tutional law relations were discontinued to be only restored in 1868 with the Croa-
to–Hungarian Compromise, which again recognised the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia 
6  Fig. 2. Territorial autonomies in the countries of the Hungarian Crown (1500). – 1 = Cuman (Kun) seats; 2 = Jassic 
( Jász) seat ( Jazygia); 3 = Saxon seats in Transylvania; 4 = Saxon XVI towns (pawned to Poland); 5 = Saxon XI 
towns (in Hungarian Zips, Szepes, Spiš); 6 = Sedes X lanceatorum; 7 = Székely seats
7  Szabó, P. Z.: Horvátország és mai részei a magyar történelemben (Croatia and actual parts in the Hungarian history). 
Földrajzi Zsebkönyv, Budapest: Magyar Földrajzi Társaság, 1945. 210–233. 
Fig. 2. Territorial autonomies in the countries of the Hungarian Crown (1500). – 1 = Cuman (Kun) seats; 
2 = Jassic ( Jász) seat ( Jazygia); 3 = Saxon seats in Transylvania; 4 = Saxon XVI towns (pawned to Poland); 
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as a part of the Holy Crown of Hungary with wide autonomy. This commonwealth 
of states, that is the territorial autonomy within the Hungarian state was terminated 
by the Croatian Parliament after the fall of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy, on 29 
October 1918 and it joined the new born state (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slo-
venes, Yugoslavia) later, within the framework of which it could only enjoy the same 
degree of internal independence that had been established in the Croatian–Hungarian 
commonwealth of states significantly later (1939–1941, 1974–1991). In today’s terms 
the self-governance of Croatia and Slavonia in the Hungarian state could formally be 
conceived as a regional territorial autonomy, however, with respect to the fact that the 
majority of their population was South Slav (until the middle of the 16th century al-
most the entire population was Catholic South Slav: Slavonian and Croatian), the in-
ternal independence of these territories can be understood as an ethnic based territorial 
autonomy.
Transylvania (Hung. Erdély, Rom. Ardeal, Germ. Siebenbürgen) frequently embod-
ied the different degrees of regional territorial autonomy during the first millennium 
of the Hungarian statehood, primarily because of its large distance from the core area 
of the state (Esztergom, Buda, Visegrád, Székesfehérvár) and because of its unique ge-
ographical location.8 From the 11th century the representative of the Hungarian king, 
named mercurius princeps, and later voivode, ensured the province a regional territorial 
autonomy to varying degrees, always reflecting the strength of the central power. Fol-
lowing the battle of Mohács (1526) the voivodship of Transylvania became the main 
territory of the Eastern Hungarian Kingdom ruled by John Szapolyai (former voivode, 
now King John I). Later, as agreed in the Treaty of Speyer (1570), in the following 
century it ensured the survival of the concept of an independent Hungarian statehood 
(theoretically as an inalienable part of the Hungarian Kingdom) ‘only’ as a principality. 
From 1541 this Hungarian state, which counted as an Ottoman vassal, had an extraor-
dinarily wide range of regional territorial autonomy, even a minimally suppressed sov-
ereignty within the Ottoman Empire. This relative independence ceased to exist after 
expulsion of the Turks. 
As a consequence of the Diploma Leopoldinum issued by Emperor Leopold I in 
1691, Transylvania became a province of the Habsburg Empire as a country of the Hun-
garian Crown and with a Hungarian public law status, but with its own statehood as a 
principality, and as a grand principality after 1765. After this, Transylvania and Hun-
gary were first legally reunited by Act 7 of the Law of 1848, and later, after the Austro–
Hungarian Compromise by Act 18 of the Law of 1868. As a result of the latter one the 
relative territorial independence of Transylvania – which continued to exist within the 
Hungarian state from the Middle Ages – was permanently eliminated in accordance 
with the goals aimed to be achieved by the united Hungarian nation state.
In the Middle Ages, the Hungarian rulers granted collective self-governance rights 
prevailing over the whole community and confined to a certain territory, occasionally 
for periods of centuries to numerous ethnic communities and social groups who were 
8  Kristó, Gy.: Early Transylvania (895–1324). Budapest: Lucidus. 2003.
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settled on their estates in exchange for their military service. The majority of such priv-
ileges were equal to what today we define as ethnic based territorial autonomies. The 
document that is the first one granting such rights in Europe is the charter issued by 
Andrew II of Hungary in 1224 (Andreanum), which granted the Transylvanian Saxons 
territorial based collective rights.9 
The autonomous region of the German settlers called Saxon was established in 
South Transylvania with its seat in Hermannstadt (Szeben, Sibiu) from the second half 
of the 12th century. The „Saxons” gradually settled in for the defence of the South 
Transylvanian border that had been under threat from the attacks of the regular heavy-
armed Byzantine troops in the 12–14th century to replace the light cavalry Székely 
border guard population transplanted to Eastern Carpathians. Apart from the rights 
typical for territorial autonomies, the larger Saxon settlements were granted market 
and staple rights, which resulted in an accelerated urbanisation on their territories from 
the 14th century. The Saxon autonomy in Transylvania became territorially complete in 
1486, when king Matthias Corvinus expanded their privileges included in the Andrea-
num to the entire Transylvanian Saxon ethnic territory (Königsboden, Nösnerland, 
Burzenland), thus establishing the autonomous territorial unit, “Saxonian University” 
(Universitas Saxonum).10 From the time of the Reformation, the Saxons did not only 
separate from their surroundings as regards their territory, but also their (Lutheran) 
confession. Their territorial autonomy ceased temporarily between 1785–1791 and 
1852–1860, and finally permanently as a result of the public administration reform of 
1876 (Act 33).
A territorial autonomy similar to the one of the Transylvanian Saxons’ was enjoyed 
for longer than 600 years by the majority of the Zipser Saxons (Germans) settled from 
the 12th century to the feet of the High Tatra mountains into the valley of the rivers 
Poprad and Hernád (Hornád). Their privileges were affirmed by Stephen V in 1271 
and he also declared their territory to be a closed autonomous province, independent 
of the county, with Leutschau (Lőcse, Levoča) as its seat (universitas seu provincia Sax-
onum de Scepus).11 Their customary law was affirmed and codified by Louis I (Great) 
in 1370 (Zipser Willkür). 13 out of the 24 towns of Zips (Szepes, Spiš) were pawned 
to Poland in 1412 by King Sigismund, where their autonomy continued to exist until 
its 1770 (1772) reannexation.12 While the remaining 11 Saxon towns that were not 
pawned gradually came under the rule of the county, the ones who returned in 1770 – 
and were joined by Altlublau (Ólubló, Stara Lubovňa), Pudlein (Podolin, Podolinec) 
9  Érszegi, G.: The Andreanum. The first known legal framework of regional self-administration, SENCE. Budapest, J. v. 
Komlossy. 2004. 204.
10  Müller, G.E.: Die sächsische Nationsuniversität. Verein für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde. Hermannstadt. 1928., 
Hanzó, L.: Az erdélyi szász önkormányzat kialakulása (Formation of the Transylvanian Saxon autonomy). In 
Értekezések a M. Kir. Horthy Miklós Tudományegyetem Magyar Történelmi Intézetéből, Szeged. 1941.
11  Fekete Nagy, A.: A Szepesség területi és társadalmi kialakulása (Territorial and social formation of Szepes [(Zips, 
Spiš] county). Budapest. 1934.
12  Žudel, J.: Stolice na Slovensku (Counties on the present-day territory of Slovakia). Bratislava: OBZOR. 1984.
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and Kniesen (Gnézda, Hniezdne) – could preserve their autonomy until as late as 1876 
under the name Province of 16 Zips (Szepes, Spiš) towns.
In connection with the Zips area, one of Hungary’s oldest autonomies, the ‘Sedes X 
lanceatorum’ (county of the ten lance-bearers), needs to be mentioned. The privileg-
es of its border guard inhabitants were affirmed by Béla IV in 1243.13 From the 16th 
century the population of the territory had a Slovakian majority. Later, its more than 
six-century long autonomy ceased in 1802 when it was merged into the county of Zips 
(Szepes, Spiš).
In the 12th and 13th centuries there was a close correlation between the settling in 
of the above-mentioned Transylvanian Saxons and the migration of the border guard 
Székely population, and the subsequent creation of their autonomous territories, what 
later became Székely Land (Székelyföld, Szeklerland). The Székelys of Bihar County 
were settled over to the southern region of Transylvania in the 11th century, which they 
gradually had to leave because of the Saxons moving in to their territory in the 12th and 
13th centuries in order to find their final homeland as the defenders of the eastern bor-
der in the Eastern Carpathians. In their new home, similarly to the Saxons, Cumans and 
Jassic people, they established territorial units (authorities), so-called “Seats” („Szék” 
districts) with judicial, administrative and military scope in the 14–15th centuries.14 
The privileged situation of the military society of the Székelys remained intact until 
the 16th century, for the restoration of which – after serious conflicts – the Transyl-
vanian princes in need of the military force of the Székelys made several efforts after 
1601.15 The Székely territorial autonomy (similarly to other administrative units in a 
similar situation) was terminated and merged into the newly created counties of Csík, 
Háromszék, Maros-Torda and Udvarhely by the „county reform” of 1876 (Act 33) that 
aimed at establishing a modern, centralised Hungarian nation state after half a millen-
nium of existence.
The foundations of the ethnic territorial autonomy of the Cumans (Kun people) in-
vited into the country in the middle of the 13th century were laid down by the so-called 
Cuman laws (constitutional charters) issued by Ladislaus IV. (the Cuman) of Hungary 
in 1279.16 The original clan organization of the Cumans settled in Central Hungary 
(Little Cumania in the Danube-Tisza Interfluve and Greater Cumania) was convert-
ed into a territorial organisation, into a seat-system, in the 15th century based on the 
Saxon model. The privileges of the Jassic ( Jász) people, who settled in later, granted for 
similar military services, can be connected to their charters of 1323 and 1407.17 Their 
ethnic area along the Zagyva river (today Jászság, Jassic Land) became an autonomous 
13  Fekete Nagy, A Szepesség területi és társadalmi kialakulása, op. cit. 
14  Szádeczky Kardoss, L.: A székely nemzet története és alkotmánya (History and constitution of the Székely nation). 
Budapest. 1927., Endes, M.: Erdély három nemzete és négy vallása autonómiájának története (History of the 
autonomy of the three nation and four religion of Transylvania). Budapest. 1935.
15  Egyed, Á.: A székelyek rövid története a megtelepedéstől 1918-ig (Short history of the Székelys from their settling 
until 1918). Csíkszereda: Pallas-Akadémia Kiadó. 2006.
16  Bánki-Molnár, E.: A jászkun autonómia (The Jassic-Cuman autonomy). Dél-Alföldi Évszázadok 2005. 22.
17  Gyárfás, I.: A jász-kunok története I–IV. (History of the Jassic-Cuman people I–IV.). Kecskemét–Szolnok–
Budapest. 1870–1885.
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administrative unit (“Seat”) around 1480.18 The Ottoman Power respected the local 
self-government of the Cumans and Jassic people during their authority (1541–1686), 
however, their autonomy was intermitted several times for different reasons under the 
Habsburg rule: 1702–1745 (selling), 1787–1790 and 1850–1860 (administrative re-
arrangement)19 (Figure 3). 
The autonomous territory consisting of the – from the 17th century administra-
tively more and more intertwined – Jassic and Cuman seats, the Jassic-Cuman District 
( Jászkun Kerület) with Jászberény as its seat, ceased to exist in 1876 when it was merged 
with the newly created Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok and Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun county. The 
Pechenegs (Besenyők) who were settled scattered in the country in the 12th and 13th 
centuries only had a territorial autonomy in the border area of Fejér and Tolna counties 
(Sármellék area), and even there only for a short period (1321–1352).20
The immigration of the Romanians (Vlachs, Rumanians) into the territory of the 
Hungarian Kingdom (mainly in the Southern Carpathians, Máramaros/Maramureş 
18  Fodor, F.: A Jászság életrajza (Biography of Jassic Land). Budapest: Szent István Társulat. 1942., Pálóczi Horváth, 
A.: Besenyők, kunok, jászok (Pechenegs, Cumans and Jassic people). Budapest: Hereditas. 1989.
19  Fig. 3. Territorial autonomies in the countries of the Hungarian Crown (1780). – 1 = Hajdú District; 2 = Jassic-
Cuman ( Jászkun) District ( Jazygia-Cumania); 3 = Saxon seats in Transylvania); 4 = Saxon XVI towns; 5 = Sedes 
X lanceatorum; 6 = Székely seats; 7 = Counties of Transylvania
20  Györffy, Gy.: Besenyők és magyarok (Pechenegs and Hungarians). Budapest: Kőrösi Csoma Archívum. 1939.
Fig. 3. Territorial autonomies in the countries of the Hungarian Crown (1780). – 1 = Hajdú District; 2 = Jassic-
Cuman ( Jászkun) District ( Jazygia-Cumania); 3 = Saxon seats in Transylvania); 4 = Saxon XVI towns; 5 = Sedes X 
lanceatorum; 6 = Székely seats; 7 = Counties of Transylvania
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and in the Apuşeni Mountains), who differed from the great majority of the country’s 
inhabitants both regarding their religious affiliation (Orthodox) and language (Ro-
mance), following the Mongol invasion (1241–42), became significant mainly from 
the 14th century.21 In the 14th and 15th centuries under the rule of their heads (cneaz, 
vaida, boer), in the Fogaras/Făgăraş Land, Máramaros/Maramureş county, Hátszeg/
Haţeg and Szörény/Severin district, they acquired a territorial self-governance to a 
certain degree. This Romanian autonomy, however, decayed because their leaders be-
came nobles and because they turned Hungarian (and Catholic), and therefore it never 
reached the same levels as those of the Saxons’ or the Székelys’.22
The Serbs23, populating the devastated southern territories abandoned by the Hun-
garians in the 16th and 17th centuries, strove more and more overtly for territorial 
self-governance – beyond their self-government provided by their Orthodox Church. 
Beyond the privileges issued by Leopold I between 1690 and 1695, they already had a 
certain degree of territorial autonomy over the territories with a Serbian majority (Reg-
iment of Petrovaradin, Illyrian section of the Banat General Command, Šajkaš district) 
in charge of the Military Border (Militär-Grenze) ruled from Vienna, between 1700 
and 1873. The Serbian national congress in Temesvár (Timişoara) addressed a plea to 
Leopold II on 4 November 1790 about the Serbian territorial autonomy to be created 
on the territory of South Hungary, but it was rejected by the Emperor a few months 
later.
At the time of the 1848–49 Hungarian revolution and war of independence, after 
the Hungarian government had refused the Serbs’ demand for a territorial autonomy, 
the Serbian national congress of Sremski Karlovci proclaimed the autonomous Serbian 
Vojvodina within the Austrian Empire on 13–15 May 1848, which would have includ-
ed Bács-Bodrog county, the western part of the Banat, the Szerémség (Srem, Syrmia) 
and the south-eastern corner of Baranya. After the fall of the war of independence, on 
18 November 1849, emperor Franz Joseph I created the province called the “Serbian 
Vojvodina and Banat of Temesvár” out of the parts of Bács (Bač), Torontál (Torontal), 
Temes (Timiş), Krassó (Caraş) and Szerém (Srem) counties that had a civil administra-
tion, and which he re-annexed to Hungary on 27 December 1860. The province, which 
had a short life but encompassed large territories (nonetheless it was Serbian mostly in 
its name), did not satisfy the requests of the Serbs, since their nation only constituted 
a mere 20.4% out of the total population of 1.5 million, preceded by the Romanians 
(28%) and the Germans (24.5%).24
21  Fekete Nagy, A. and Makkai, L. (eds.): Documenta historiam Valachorum in Hungaria illustrantia usque ad annum 
1400 p. Christum. L’études sur L’Europe Centre-Orieantale 29. Budapest. 1941.
22  Fekete Nagy, A. and Makkai, L. (eds.): Documenta historiam Valachorum in Hungaria illustrantia usque ad annum 
1400 p. Christum, op. cit.
23  The Serbs arrived in Hungary (mainly to the southern regions and along the Danube) in the largest numbers in 
1690 following Leopold I’s invitation, who, in exchange for their military service received them as a political nation 
(natio rasciana) with autonomy (Czoernig, K.: Ethnographie der Oesterreichischen Monarchie. II. Band. Wien, 
1857. 157–158.
24  Hegediš, A. and Čobanović, K.: Demografska i agrarna statistika Vojvodine 1767–1867 (Demographic and agrarian 
statistics of Vojvodina 1767–1867). Novi Sad, Filozofski Fakultet u Novom Sadu, Institut za istoriju. 1991.
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The disappointed Serbs at the national congress in Sremski Karlovci on 2 April 1861 
once again demanded the establishment of the Serbian Vojvodina, an autonomous 
province with Serbian as the only official language, however, this time the territories 
were adjusted in a way that they matched areas with an approximate Serbian majority 
(Szerémség/Srem, Western Banat and the southern half of Bácska/Bačka).25  (Figure 
426).
In the same year, on 6–7 June 1861, the Slovak national congress in Turócszent-
márton (Martin) also demanded an ethnic based territorial self-government based on 
Hungary’s integrity for the Upper Hungarian Slovak District.27 The claimed Slovakian 
autonomous territory would have comprised the counties with Slovak majorities and 
25  Đorđević, J.: Karta Bačke, Srema i Banata sa predloženima od blagoveštenskoga sabora za Vojvodinu Srbsku (Map of 
Bačka, Srem and Banat with the proposals of the Parlament of the Serbian Vojvodina). Novi Sad, N. Fux. 1861.
26  Fig. 4. Claims of the largest national minorities of Hungary for ethnic based territorial autonomy (2nd half of 19th 
century). – 1 = Croats, Bunjevci, Šokci; 2 = Hungarians; 3 = Romanians; 4 = Serbs; 5 = Slovaks; 6 = Other ethnic 
groups; 7 = Border of autonomous Croatia-Slavonia; 8 = Border of Vojvodina claimed by Serbs (March 24, 1861); 
9 = Border of Upper Hungarian Slovak District claimed by Slovaks ( June 7, 1861); 10 = Border of autonomous 
Transylvania claimed by Romanians (since 1867).
27  Kemény, G. G.: Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában (1867–1918) 
(Documents to the history of the minority issue in Hungary during the Austro–Hungarian dualism, 1867–1918). 
Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó. 1952.
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of 19th century). – 1 = Croats, Bunjevci, Šokci; 2 = Hungarians; 3 = Romanians; 4 = Serbs; 5 = Slovaks; 6 = Other 
ethnic groups; 7 = Border of autonomous Croatia-Slavonia; 8 = Border of Vojvodina claimed by Serbs (March 
24, 1861); 9 = Border of Upper Hungarian Slovak District claimed by Slovaks ( June 7, 1861); 10 = Border of 
autonomous Transylvania claimed by Romanians (since 1867)
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the Slovakian majority areas of the neighbouring counties and its borders would have 
adjusted to the Slovakian ethnic territories.
The concept of territorial autonomy adjusted to their ethnic areas did not become 
known among Romanians at this time. Their political struggles primarily concentrated 
on the autonomy of Transylvania, that had by the middle of the 17th century been pop-
ulated by a Romanian majority (59.5% in 1850).28
On 11 February 1867 the representatives of the different ethnic minorities promot-
ed a bill that would have recognised six political nations within Hungary (Hungarian, 
Romanian, Serbian, Slovakian, Russian /Rusyn-Ruthenian/, German) and that would 
have demanded – among several other requests – the adjustment of the borders of the 
counties and electorates to the ethnic areas.29 This latter proposal would have created a 
cluster of adjacent autonomous territories of the ethnic minorities on the peripheries 
of the country. 
Following the Austro–Hungarian Compromise of 1867, Act 44 of the Law of 1868 
(On the subject of the equal rights of the nationalities), the first law on national minor-
ities of the world was, in fact, “a compromise between doctrinal liberalism, minority 
programmes aiming at domesticating the system of national autonomies and the sup-
porters of a unitary Hungarian nation state”.30 Similarly to the Hungarian government 
of 1848–49 and following the French nation state concept, the law only recognised 
the existence of one and indivisible Hungarian (political) nation in Hungary, irrespec-
tive of the ethnic and linguistic affiliation of its citizens.31 Consequently the Hungar-
ian state, which had a territorial autonomy within the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy 
(except for the Croatian–Slavonian self-governance), emphatically refused any ethnic 
based territorial autonomy requests initiated by its minorities, since these were viewed 
as a first step of their separation and thus as one of the gravest dangers threatening the 
country’s territorial integrity.
The period between 1918 and 1945
After the First World War, during the Romanian, Serbian and Czech occupation of Hun-
gary and at the times of a military and economic chaos, the representatives of the differ-
ent national minorities proclaimed their separation from Hungary one after the other. 
Mihály Károlyi’s government, who came into power as the result of the “Aster Revolu-
28  Mester, M.: Az autonóm Erdély és a román nemzeti követelések az 1863–64. évi nagyszebeni országgyűlésen (The 
autonomous Transylvania and the Romanian national claims at the parliament of Nagyszeben [Hermannstadt, 
Sibiu] in 1863–64). Budapest. 1936.
29  Kemény, G.G.: Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában (1867–1918), op. cit.
30  Szász, Z.: Kormánypolitika és nemzetiségek (Government policy and the minorities). In Glatz, F. (ed.): Magyarok a 
Kárpát-medencében. Budapest: Pallas. 1988. 175–180.
31  Katus, L.: Egy kisebbségi törvény születése. Az 1868. évi nemzetiségi törvény évfordulójára (Birth of a minority law. 
To the anniversary of the Hungarian Minority Law of 1868). Regio 1993. 4. (4): 99–128., Katus, L.: Nemzetiségi 
kérdés, nemzetiségi politika 1848–1849-ben (Nationality issue, nationality politics in Hungary in 1848–49). 
Kisebbségkutatás 11. 2002. (1): 66–76.
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tion” (25–31 October 1918), made a historically belated attempt to federalise Hungary 
on an ethnic-territorial basis and to compromise with the national minorities in order to 
preserve its territorial integrity.32 After failures to compromise with the Romanian and 
Slovakian national councils, the main emphasis was laid on retaining the smaller ethnic 
groups of the Hungarian territories not yet occupied by the Czech, Romanian and Serbi-
an troops constantly advancing in November 1918. On 21 December 1918, the territo-
rial autonomy of the Rusyns (Ruthenians) (Act 10) was enacted (the autonomous region 
called “Ruska Krajna” on the Ruthenian majority territories of Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa and 
Máramaros counties). The Germans were granted a similar right (Act 6) to establish a ter-
ritorial autonomy on 28 January 1919.33 The third nationality law of the Károlyi govern-
ment on 11 March 1919 (Law 30 on the self-government of Slovakia –Slovenská Krajina) 
was completely anachronistic, since by that time the territory referred to by the law was 
under Czech military occupation and was de facto a part of new-born Czechoslovakia 
recognised by the Entente powers. 
After the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (1 August 1919), following an al-
most complete military occupation of the country, the Treaty of Versailles (Trianon) 
on 4 June 1920 confirmed with the means of the international law the dissolution of 
the historical Hungarian state territory that had started to dissolve as early as at the end 
of 1918. This resulted in annexing 67.1% of the country’s almost 283 thousand square 
kilometres of territory and 33% of its ethnic Hungarian population to the neighbouring 
states.34 As a result, the ethnic homogeneity of the population, that is the proportion 
of the ethnic Hungarians living within the borders of the Hungarian state increased 
(from 54.6% in 1910 to 89.6% in 1920) and thus, because extended territories with 
non-Hungarian majorities were annexed to other countries, the question of the ethnic 
based territorial autonomy practically ceased to exist for the Hungarian state.
With the Treaties near Paris (1919–1920), the decision-makers created (along with 
Hungary and Austria that were also shrunk into small states with a nearly homogeneous 
population) medium-sized, but multi-ethnic countries (e.g. Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes [S.H.S.]) on the ruins of the large, multi-ethnic 
Austro–Hungarian Monarchy and the historical Hungarian state. The aggregate figure 
of the non-Germans and non-Hungarians was 57.1% in 1910 in the Monarchy that 
had 51.4 million inhabitants, while the joint proportions of the non-ruling nations and 
minorities in the new (and enlarged) states around 1921 were as follows: non-Czechs 
in Czechoslovakia: 49.8%, non-Romanians in Romania: 28.1%, non-Serbs in the King-
dom of S.H.S.: 62.3%35 (Figure 5). 
32  Szarka, L.: A méltányos nemzeti elhatárolódás lehetősége 1918 végén (Possibility of a fair national separation at 
the end of 1918). Regio 1. (1) 1990. 49–65., Szarka, L.: A történeti Magyarország felbomlása: katonai akciók, 
demarkációs vonalak (Dissolution of the historical Hungary: military actions, demarcation lines). In Bárdi, N., 
Fedinec, Cs. and Szarka, L. (eds.): Kisebbségi magyar közösségek a 20. században. Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó – 
MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet. 2008. 14–21.
33  Kemény, G.G.: Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában (1867–1918), op. cit.
34  Lőkkös, J.: Trianon számokban (The Treaty of Trianon in figures). Budapest: Püski. 2000.
35  Fig. 5. Ethnic structure of the population of the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1921). – 1 = 
State border (1914); 2 = State border (1924); 3 = Bosniaks; 4 = Croats, Bunjevci, Šokci; 5 = Czechs; 6 = Germans; 
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The fact that about 20 million people with minority background were annexed to 
the states governed by the Czechs, Romanians and Serbs sheds light on the fact that the 
strategic, military and economic interests of the Entente and their allies surmounted 
the principle of people’s self-governance, the ethnic principle, when drawing the bor-
ders of the aforementioned states.36
When marking the new borders of the defeated Hungary, language boundaries 
(apart from the Croatian and Austrian neighbourhood) played no role whatsoever. 
The principle of ethnic self-governance was only important from the perspective of the 
decision-makers to the extent that they intended that as few non-Hungarians as possi-
ble should remain under Hungarian supremacy and that the vast majority of Slovaks, 
Romanians and South Slavs of the Carpathian Basin should become citizens of Czech-
oslovakia, Romania and the Kingdom of S.H.S. Beyond these principles it was the eco-
nomic and military interests of the neighbouring states that determined the marking of 
the new Hungarian borderline: the plain regions populated primarily by ethnic Hun-
garians which played a decisive role in supplying the Slovakian, Ruthenian, Romani-
7 = Hungarians; 8 = Poles; 9 = Romanians; 10 = Rusyns, Ukrainians; 11 = Serbs; 12 = Slovaks; 13 = Slovenes; 14 
= Other ethnic groups
36  Macartney, C.A.: Hungary and her successors. The Treaty of Trianon and its consequences 1919–1937. London–New 
York–Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1937.
Fig. 5. Ethnic structure of the population of the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
(1921). – 1 = State border (1914); 2 = State border (1924); 3 = Bosniaks; 4 = Croats, Bunjevci, Šokci; 5 = Czechs; 
6 = Germans; 7 = Hungarians; 8 = Poles; 9 = Romanians; 10 = Rusyns, Ukrainians; 11 = Serbs; 12 = Slovaks; 13 = 
Slovenes; 14 = Other ethnic groups
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an and Serbian highland population with food (mainly bread-grain); the annexation 
of railroads that were of vital importance in the winners’ communication among each 
other (avoiding Hungary); the creation of a state border that was aligned to natural 
objects (e.g. rivers, ridges) and was militarily defensible; marking the state border far 
away from the capital (e.g. Belgrade).37 The “Hungarian issue” in the Carpathian Basin 
that played an important role after 1920 from the perspective of our current topic was 
born as a result of asserting these criteria in the course of the dictated peace in Trianon 
(the annexation of 3.3 million ethnic Hungarians and their homeland, among others 
the Székely Land and an almost homogeneous Hungarian ethnic territory in the width 
of 10–60 kilometres from Bratislava [Pozsony] to Subotica [Szabadka] among others).
The successor states, that united in the alliance called “Little Entente” in 1920–21 
against the Hungarian revisionism, declared themselves to be unitary and indivisible 
nation states in their first constitutions and because of the fear of a disintegration of 
their multi-ethnic countries they denied the minorities’ collective rights of any kind 
(primarily the ones related to an ethnic based territorial autonomy). As a result of their 
centralising, ethnically homogenising and assimilating policy, they started to rearrange 
the administrative territorial structure (province, county and district borders) inherit-
ed from the (mostly Hungarian) past in a way that the “unreliable” (mostly Hungarian) 
minorities should become (also numerical) minorities in the new administrative units 
everywhere (or at least wherever possible). Such ethnically manipulative administrative 
reform (that disjointed the Hungarian ethnic areas administratively) was enacted in 
Czechoslovakia in 1923 and 1927, in the Kingdom of S.H.S in 1923 and 1929, in Ro-
mania 1925 and later in 1938.38
The leaders of Hungary and those of the Hungarian minorities of the successor 
states were hoping to solve the problem of the annexed Hungarian ethnic territories of 
the border regions primarily with a territorial revision (re-annexation to Hungary), the 
change of the state borders, and, in the period between the two world wars there were 
even plans by Hungarians for an ethnic based (Hungarian) territorial autonomy.39
37  Edvi, I.A. and Halász, A.: La Hongrie économique en cartes – The Economies of Hungary in Maps – Magyarország 
gazdasági térképekben. Budapest. 1920.
38  Kocsis, K.: Jugoszlávia. Egy felrobbant etnikai mozaik esete. Az etnikai konfliktusok történeti-földrajzi háttere a 
volt Jugoszlávia területén (Yugoslavia. The case of an exploded ethnic mosaic. Historic-geographic background 
of the ethnic conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia). Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány. 1993., 
Kocsis, K.: A közigazgatási térfelosztás változásai a mai Szlovákia területén a XX. században (Changes of the 
administrative division on the present-day territory of Slovakia in the 20th century). In Pásztor, C. (ed.): „Ahol a 
határ elválaszt” Trianon és következményei a Kárpát-medencében. Balassagyarmat: Nógrád Megyei Levéltár. 2002. 
131–153., Molnár, J.: Területi-közigazgatási felosztás Erdélyben, 1876–1968. (Territorial-administrative division in 
Transylvania, 1876–1968). Korunk 1992. 3. (9): 88–97. 
39  Rónai, A.: A nemzetiségi kérdés területi megoldásai (Territorial solving of the minority issue). Magyar Szemle 31. 
(3) 1937. 201–209., Szvatkó, P.: Svájci példa. A három magyar kanton (The Swiss example. The three Hungarian 
canton). Új Szellem 9. 1937. 20–21., Bárdi, N.: Javaslatok, modellek az erdélyi kérdés kezelésére (A magyar 
elképzelések, 1918–1940) (Proposals, models to manage the Transylvanian issue [The Hungarian conceptions, 
1918–1940]). Magyar Kisebbség 9. (1–2) 2004. 329–376., Molnár, M.: Felvidéki magyar autonómia-törekvések 
(Hungarian autonomy aspirations in Slovakia). In Kupa, L. (ed): Kisebbségi autonómia-törekvések Közép-Európában 
– a múltban és a jelenben. Pécs: PTE – Bookmaster Kft., 2009. 170–180.
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The wide-scope territorial autonomy promised to the “fellow-nations” in the central-
ised Czechoslovak and South Slav states was not realised between 1918 and 1938, in 
spite of the fierce political struggles of especially the Slovaks and the Croats. Although 
the Rusyns were not considered to be a fellow-nation by the Czechs, the new Czecho-
slovakia needed their territories from a strategic point of view, therefore, in the Treaty 
of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (10 September 1919), it even promised a wide-scope territo-
rial autonomy to Subcarpathia (Podkarpatska Rus, today Transcarpathia in Ukraine).40 
Czechoslovakia postponed the establishment of the Slovakian and Rusyn territorial au-
tonomies (for two decades) until the last minute, until the October of 1938, after losing 
the German majority Sudetenland in the Munich Agreement on 29 September 1938, 
and later losing the Polish majority Zaolzie area in Czech Silesia on 2 October 1938.41 
After the attainment of the Slovakian and Rusyn territorial autonomy, the annex-
ation of the German- and Polish-majority territories to Germany and Poland – the 
unsuccessful Hungarian–Czechoslovak negotiations in Komárno (Komárom) – the 
First Vienna Award took place on 2 November 1938, where Czechoslovakia returned 
to Hungary a 11,927 square kilometres large territory inhabited predominantly by 
Hungarians (84.4%) that it had occupied in 1919. The Slovaks and the Rusyns, who 
were disappointed by the Czech in the course of their two-decade-long conflict over 
the question of autonomy, were not contented with a territorial autonomy any longer. 
In line with the aggressive foreign policy of Hitler’s Germany that unleashed the world 
war with Germany’s support, the independence of the Slovak Republic and Car-
patho-Ukraine was proclaimed on 14 March 1939, which resulted in the dissolution 
of the Czecho-Slovak state, and, on the following day, the occupation of the remaining 
Czech parts of the country by the Nazi Germany.42 In the subsequent two weeks the 
12,146 square kilometres large Carpatho-Ukrainian and eastern Slovakian territories 
(that were occupied by the Czechs in 1919) were reoccupied by the Hungarian Army 
and a Hungarian–Polish joint border was created.43
The Croats lost their wide-scope territorial autonomy (Croatia–Slavonia) that they 
possessed in the Hungarian half of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy (Transleitha-
nia, Hungarian Empire) in the Serbian ruled S.H.S. Kingdom which was founded on 
1 December 1918. Consequently, they fought fiercely against the Serbian supremacy 
between the two world wars in order to regain their lost territorial autonomy and co-
equality.44 After the annexation (“Anschluß”) of the neighbouring Austria by the Ger-
mans (12 March 1938), the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (14 March 1939) and the 
40  Pop, I.: Dějiny Podkarpatské Rusi v datech (History of Subcarpathia in dates). Praha: Nakladelstvi Libri 2005.
41  The autonomy of Slovakia was proclaimed in Žilina on 6 Oct. 1938, and the Prague government consented 
to appointing the government of the autonomous Subcarpathia on 11 Oct. 1938 (Fedinec, Cs.: A kárpátaljai 
magyarság történeti kronológiája, 1918–1944 (Historical chronology of Hungarians in Subcarpathia, 1918–1944). 
Galánta–Dunaszerdahely: Fórum Intézet–Lilium Aurum 2002). 
42  Fedinec, Cs.: A kárpátaljai magyarság történeti kronológiája, 1918–1944., op. cit.
43  Thirring, L.: A visszatért kárpátaljai területen végrehajtott népösszeírás előzetes eredményei (Preliminary results of 
the population census completed on the returned Subcarpathian territory). Statisztikai Szemle 8. 1939. 939–950. 
44  Csuka, J.: A délvidéki magyarság története 1918–1941 (History of the Hungarians in Yugoslavia 1918–1941). 
Budapest: Püski. 1995.
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seizure of Albania by Italy (7 April 1939), on the eve of the second world war, in the last 
minute, the increasingly isolated regime in Belgrade managed to come to terms with 
the Croats (Cvetković-Maček Agreement, 24 August 1939) and granted them the au-
tonomous Banate of Croatia (Banovina Hrvatska, 65,456 square kilometres, 4 million 
inhabitants) including also Dalmatia and West Herzegovina, which comprised 88% 
of the Croats of Yugoslavia. The Croats, who, after two decades of desperate political 
struggle, were bitterly disappointed with the coexistence with the Serbs, were no longer 
contented with the territorial autonomy, which they considered to be the first mile-
stone on their way to a total independence.
In the course of the second world war, after the occupation of France by the Ger-
mans and the seizure of Bessarabia by the Soviets (28 June 1940) a casus belli was cre-
ated over the issue of Transylvania between the strategically weakened Romania and 
Hungary that regained some of its strength as a result of the territorial revisions. Af-
ter the failure of the negotiations at Turnu Severin (16–24 August 1940), in order to 
avoid a war between Hungary and Romania, the Nazi Germany and Italy volunteered 
to arbitrate, which was accepted by both the Romanian and the Hungarian parties.45 
The Second Vienna Award compelled Romania to return a territory of 43,104 square 
kilometres (“Northern Transylvania”) to Hungary from among the territories occupied 
in 1918–19.46 As a result of the division of Transylvania, Hungary gained 2.6 million 
inhabitants (with almost 1.3 million non-Hungarians), while Romania kept a Transyl-
vanian population of 3.3 million (with 1.1 million non-Romanians).47
On 27 March 1941, after the coup d’état overthrowing the pro-German Cvetković 
Government that had joined the Tripartite Pact, Hitler ordered the occupation of Yu-
goslavia with the involvement of its neighbours. On 6 April 1941 German and Italian 
troops started a relatively fast invasion of the politically extremely unstable country, 
which was officially terminated by the capitulation of the Yugoslav Army led by Serbs 
on 17 April. In the meantime, on 10 April, Ante Pavelić, the supreme leader (poglavnik) 
of the Croatian Ustasha movement, proclaimed in Zagreb the Independent State of 
Croatia (NDH),48 which meant that Yugoslavia became dissolved. On the day when 
the Germans occupied the Srem, Banat and Serbia (11 April), the Hungarian troops 
entered Baranya and Bačka, regions with a relative Hungarian majority, which had been 
occupied by Serbian troops in 1918 and which now practically became a no man’s land. 
The Axis Powers divided the territory of the occupied Yugoslavia on 24 April 1941 
at the Vienna conference. Hungary was allowed to keep the re-annexed Bácska (Bačka) 
45  Rónai, A.: Térképezett történelem (History in maps). Budapest: Magvető. 1989.
46  Thirring, L.: A visszacsatolt keleti terület. Terület és népesség (The reannexed eastern territory /North Transylvania. 
Territory and population). Statisztikai Szemle 8–9. 1940. 662–679.
47  Varga, E. Á.: Népszámlálások a jelenkori Erdély területén (Censuses on the contemporary territory of Transylvania). 
Budapest: Regio – MTA Történettudományi Intézet. 1992.
48  The territory of the Independent State of Croatia encompassed 102,725 square kilometres (and primarily included 
the historical Croatia-Slavonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts of Dalmatia unoccupied by the Italians). Out of the 
total population of 5.6 million 52.5% were Roman Catholics (predominantly Croats), 32% Orthodox (Serbs) and 
13% Muslims (Bosniaks) (Klemenčić, M.: Trojednica s BiH. Državnost i granice (2) (Croatia–Slavonia–Dalmatia 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Statehood and borders). Novi Vjesnik CIII. 16053. 1992.06.01.)
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and Baranya, and was additionally given the Slovenian majority Prekmurje, that it lost 
in 1919, and the almost entirely ethnic Croatian Muraköz (Međimurje). This result-
ed in Hungary’s regaining 11,475 square kilometres with a population of one million 
(39% Hungarian) from the former Yugoslavia.49
As a result of the territorial revisions between 1938 and 1941, the Kingdom of Hun-
gary succeeded in regaining 41.5% of its lost territories and this meant that its territory 
grew to 171,753 square kilometres and its population rose to 14.7 million. Together 
with the increase of the territory, 95.2% of the Carpathian Basin’s 12 million Hungari-
ans became residents within the Hungarian state, however, in exchange, the proportion 
of the minorities increased from 7.9% to 22.5% (equalling approximately 3.3 million 
inhabitants) between the censuses of 1931 and 1941 in Hungary.50 (Figure 6)51. 
49  Schneider, Á.: A visszafoglalt délvidéki terület. Népességi és gazdasági áttekintés (Territory reannexed from 
Yugoslavia. A demographic and economic overview). Statisztikai Szemle 11. 1941. 767–786., Fogarasi, Z.: A 
népesség anyanyelvi, nemzetiségi és vallási megoszlása törvényhatóságonkint 1941-ben (The population by the 
mother tongue, ethnicity and religion in the municipalities of Hungary in 1941). Statisztikai Szemle 1–3. 1944. 
1–20.
50  Fogarasi, Z.: A népesség anyanyelvi, nemzetiségi és vallási megoszlása törvényhatóságonkint 1941-ben, op. cit.
51  Fig. 6. Ethnic structure of Hungary and her neighbours (1941).  – 1 = Bosniaks; 2 = Croats, Bunjevci, Šokci; 3 = 
Germans; 4 = Hungarians; 5 = Jews; 6 = Romanians; 7 = Rusyns; 8 = Serbs; 9 = Slovaks; 10 = Slovenes; 11 = 
Other ethnic groups.
Fig. 6. Ethnic structure of Hungary and her neighbours (1941).  – 1 = Bosniaks; 2 = Croats, Bunjevci, Šokci; 
3 = Germans; 4 = Hungarians; 5 = Jews; 6 = Romanians; 7 = Rusyns; 8 = Serbs; 
9 = Slovaks; 10 = Slovenes; 11 = Other ethnic groups
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It was only the Rusyn minority who considered (due to historical and geographi-
cal reasons) to establish an ethnic based territorial autonomy (Voivodeship of Subcar-
pathia) within the Hungarian state. This was proposed by Prime Minister Pál Teleki as a 
legislative bill, however, he was later forced to withdraw it on 5 August 1940 because of 
internal political and military interests.52 On the territory of the Government of Sub-
carpathia, administrative units independent of the Hungarian counties were created 
instead of an absolute autonomy, where Rusyn (“Hungaro-Russian”) was declared the 
second official language after Hungarian.53
The period between 1945 and 1989
At the end of the Second World War, after the changes of state power, the territorial re-
visions between 1938 and 1941 were annulled. This was finalised from the Hungarian 
aspect on 10 February 1947 in the Paris Peace Treaty. During the war, the Czech-ruled 
Czechoslovakia was revived and Yugoslavia was turned into a federal state in 1945 at the 
cost of ceasing the independence of Slovakia and Croatia. The Ukrainian (Rusyn)-ma-
jority Transcarpathia (formerly called Subcarpathia) was annexed to the Soviet Union as 
ruled in the Czechoslovak–Soviet agreement of 29 June 1945. The Hungarian–Roma-
nian state border drawn in 1920 was resorted, and later the Romanian administration 
was restored in Northern Transylvania, which had become the subject of Soviet political 
blackmail and which had been under Soviet rule between 12–14 November 1944 and 
9–13 March 1945.54
As a consequence of the changes of power, large-scale forced migrations took place. 
The German and Hungarian population in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania, 
decimated by evacuation, flight and blood-revenge were considered to be war culprits, 
the servants of the occupants and were looked upon as collectively guilty and thus their 
total or partial elimination (expulsion, deportation) began immediately, especially 
from the strategically important border areas,55, 56 Taking advantage of the ”favourable” 
52  Fedinec, Cs.: Kárpátaljai autonómia-koncepciók 1918–1944 között (Autonomy conceptions in Subcarpathia 
between 1918 and 1944). Kisebbségkutatás 11. (3) 2001. 450–469.
53  Botlik, J.: Közigazgatás és nemzetiségpolitika Kárpátalján I–II. (Public administration and minority politics in 
Subcarpathia). Nyíregyháza. 2005.
54  Vincze, G.: A romániai magyar kisebbség történeti kronológiája, 1944–1953. (Historical chronology of Hungarian 
minority in Romania, 1944–1953). Budapest–Szeged: TLA–JATE. 1994.
55  Kocsis, K.: Changing ethnic, religious and political patterns in the Carpatho-Balkan area. In Kertész, Á. and 
Kovács, Z. (eds): New perspectives in Hungarian geography. Studies in Geography in Hungary 27. Budapest: 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1992. 115–142., Kocsis, K..: Die ethnische Struktur in den Grenzräumen der karpatho-
pannonischen Region. In Bevölkerungstransfer und Systemwandel. Ostmitteleuropäische Grenzen nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg. Hrsg. Schultz, H. Berlin, Verlag Arno Spitz GmbH., 1999. 69–104.
56  After 1944 about one million Germans “disappeared” (fled, were evacuated, deported or killed) from the 
Carpathian Basin: e.g. 336 thousand from Vojvodina and Croatia, 274 thousand from Transylvania (in broader 
sense), 255 thousand from Hungary and 120 thousand from Slovakia (Kocsis, K.: Changing ethnic, religious and 
political patterns in the Carpatho-Balkan area, op. cit., Czibulka, Z. et al.: A magyarországi németek kitelepítése és az 
1941. évi népszámlálás (The deportation of the Germans of Hungary and the census in 1941). Budapest: Központi 
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historical moment, to replace the Germans and the Hungarians, an organised colonisa-
tion of the members of the given country’s titular nation – mainly embedded into the 
framework of agricultural reforms – began immediately, which resulted in a fundamen-
tal change in the ethnic structure of the (mainly borderland and urban) population, 
served national-social purposes and aimed at making any prospective Hungarian claims 
for territorial revision impossible.57
As a result of the general anti-minority atmosphere as well as the endeavours of the 
“mother-countries” to reach an ethnic concentration and homogeneity, there was a 
boost in the migration of minorities into their nation states, which caused a significant 
increase in the proportion of the titular nation in each country and, at the same time, a 
considerable ethnic “dilution”, a mass mixture of the autochthonous and allochthonous 
(new-comer) population and hence an increase of the interethnic tension. In spite of 
the forced migrations, a Hungarian minority of about 3 million still remained on the 
territories of the countries neighbouring Hungary, half of whom lived in the border-
land, and the settlement area of whom became ethnically more mixed, but theoretically 
still allowed for a potential realisation of an ethnic based territorial autonomy.
In the countries of the Carpathian Basin (except for Austria) under the influence 
(mostly military control) of the Soviet Union, Soviet-type communist regimes were 
forcefully created between 1945 and 1948, which made it impossible in the following 
decades to realise any ethnic based territorial autonomy. Independently from this, it 
should also be mentioned that Yugoslavia, reborn as a “federal people’s republic” in 
1945, ruled by Josip Broz Tito – as opposed to the centralised, Serbian-ruled Yugosla-
via between the two world wars – guaranteed radically different life conditions to all 
non-Serbian ethnic groups of the state by practicing territorial decentralisation, main-
taining an autonomy of Yugoslav republics, recognising and granting in principle the 
identity and equality of each South Slav nation (Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, 
Muslimans/Bosniaks, Serbs, Slovenes). 
On 29 November 1945, at the time of the creation of the communist Yugoslavia, 
Vojvodina was granted the autonomous province status, which was promised as early as 
the national liberation war (in 1943). “Vojvodina” (called South Hungary or Délvidék/
Southern Region until 1918) was granted a regional autonomy because of the histori-
cal past and ethnic diversity of this Central European territory and the strong regional 
identity of local Serbs. This, of course, did not mean that the minorities of Vojvodina 
(especially the 429 thousand Hungarians living there) could realise an ethnic based 
self-governance, since owing to the forced migrations, after 1945, the majority of Vo-
jvodina’s population was ethnic Serbian (1948: 50.6%, 2011: 66.8%). The regional au-
Statisztikai Hivatal. 2004.). The number of Hungarians who fled, moved or were deported to the present territory 
of Hungary between 1944 and 1950 from the neighbouring countries is an estimated 230–300 thousand (Stark, T.: 
Magyarország második világháborús embervesztesége (Population losses of Hungary during the second world war). 
Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézet. 1989., Kocsis, K.: Changing ethnic, religious and political patterns in 
the Carpatho-Balkan area, op. cit.)
57 Kocsis, K.: Die ethnische Struktur in den Grenzräumen der karpatho-pannonischen Region, op. cit. 
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tonomy itself could also be completely realised (almost up to the level of the self-gov-
ernance of the Yugoslav member republics) after the new constitution of 21 February 
1974.58
In the Carpathian Basin an ethnic based territorial autonomy in the 20th century 
was realised only for a short period (between 1952 and 1960/68) in the middle of Ro-
mania. What the Soviet Union (that is Stalin, to be more precise) did not realise on the 
annexed Transcarpathia and what it did not expect Czechoslovakia to do, it requested 
(the non-Slavic and his 1941 and 1944 war opponent) Romania to do: the realisation 
of the Hungarian territorial autonomy.59 The new Romanian constitution enacted on 
24 September 1952 called into existence (acting upon Soviet order) the Hungarian 
Autonomous Region (MAT), an administrative unit comprising 13,550 square kilo-
metres, with a seat in Târgu Mureş (Marosvásárhely), consisting of 10 rayons and 731 
thousand (77% Hungarian) population. The territory of the region basically encom-
passed the historical Székely Land. The MAT included 565 thousand Hungarians, 
however, 63.7% of the Transylvanian Hungarian population (almost a million people) 
remained outside the borders of the MAT, whose minority right (exactly because of the 
existence of the MAT) were violated to greater and greater extents, and whose Hungar-
ian language usage was repressed. The Romanian communist nation state increased the 
political pressure and restricted the power of the MAT due to a decrease in the Soviet 
pressure following Stalin’s death (1953), the Transylvanian Hungarian sympathy with 
the defeated Hungarian revolution and war of independence of 1956 and the Hun-
garian national solidarity reaching over the borders. On 24 December 1960, in the 
course of reorganising (and renaming) this administrative unit (Mureş-Hungarian Au-
tonomous Region/MMAT), the southern rayons (Sfântu Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy, 
Târgu Secuiesc/Kézdivásárhely with Hungarian majority population) were adjoined 
to the Braşov Region (absolutely dominated by Romanians) on alleged economic 
grounds, and, at the same time, rayons with a Romanian majority (Luduş/Marosludas 
and Târnăveni/Dicsőszentmárton) were annexed to the MMAT.60 (Figure 7)61
This reorganisation did not only mean that the Romanian nation state altered the 
territory and ethnic composition62 of the area in a way that was extremely disadvanta-
geous for the Hungarians, but it also accelerated the process of diminishing the insti-
tutional background of the Hungarian territorial autonomy, that had thus far had the 
58  Strugar, V.: Jugoslavija: federacija i republika (Yugoslavia: federation and republic). Beograd: Narodna knjiga. 1976.
59  Bottoni, S.: Sztálin a székelyeknél. A Magyar Autonóm Tartomány története, 1952–1960 (Stalin at the Székelys. 
History of the Hungarian Autonomous Region, 1952–1960). Csíkszereda: Pro-Print. 2008.
60  Elekes, T.: Székelyföld közigazgatás-földrajzi változásai a 13. századtól napjainkig (Changes in the administrative 
geography of Székelyland since the 13th century). Földrajzi Közlemények 135. (4) 2011. 415–429.
61  Fig. 7. Ethnic Map of the Mureş-Hungarian Autonomous Region and its neighbourhood (Romania, 1966). – 
1 = Boundary of the Hungarian Autonomous Region (1952-1960); 2 = Boundary of the Mureş-Hungarian 
Autonomous Region (1960-1968).
62  The proportion of Hungarians in the region, the territory of which changed because of the reorganisation at the 
end of 1960, decreased between the 1956 and the 1966 censuses from 77.3% to 60.2% (while the proportion of the 
Romanians rose from 20.1% to 36.8%).
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effect of a “cultural greenhouse”.63 The autonomous region (considered by many to be 
a mere ethno-political showroom, a Hungarian ghetto anyway), which was turned into 
a formal entity as one stage of the less and less concealed Romanian nation building 
policy aimed at an ethnic homogenisation, was terminated with the enactment of the 
law restoring the county system on 19 December 1968.
The federalist restructuring of Yugoslavia in reality, the shrinkage of the possibilities 
of defending Serbian interests directly, the decrease in the former Serbian dominance 
– especially after Tito’s death (1980) – immensely increased the dissatisfaction of the 
Serbs, who were accustomed to their privileged situation. They were especially indig-
nant about the fact that from among the territories that had unique ethnic or histori-
cal backgrounds, only the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina in Serbia were granted 
autonomy, whereas the Serbian-majority territories in Croatia (e.g. Krajina) were not. 
This was conceived as a great exasperation for the Serbs, considering themselves to win-
ners of the war, but losers of the peace. As a result, there were fiercer and fiercer Serbian 
attacks on the constitution of 1974 from the middle of the 1980s. After artificially 
rousing the feeling of being threatened, under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević, an 
“All-Serbian” movement was started, as a result of which in the course of the so called 
63  Bottoni, S.: Sztálin a székelyeknél. op. cit.
Fig. 7. Ethnic Map of the Mureş-Hungarian Autonomous Region and its neighbourhood (Romania, 1966). 
– 1 = Boundary of the Hungarian Autonomous Region (1952-1960); 2 = Boundary of the Mureş-Hungarian 
Autonomous Region (1960-1968)
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“anti-bureaucratic revolution” serving the Serbian concentration of power, in 1988–89 
the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo was restricted to exist merely on paper (in fact 
it was terminated).
The period after 1989
In the former socialist countries of Europe, a political, economic and social transition 
(change of regimes, changing of the regime) began in 1989, in the course of which the dem-
olition of the communist regime was started, and the foundations of the western-type 
parliamentary democracies and the market economy were laid. The most important mile-
stones of this process were the free, multiparty parliamentary elections of 1990, which 
brought about the success of the parties with strong national (often nationalist) rhetoric.64 
The events taking place in the countries of the former Soviet bloc, pointing in the di-
rection of a change of regime and also fortifying each other (e.g. revolutions, multiparty 
elections, starting to change the political-economic system, endeavours of federal mem-
ber-states to become independent) had a great impact on the political behaviour of the 
Yugoslav nations and nationalities. The formerly communist circles suddenly changed 
their internationalist guises into national ones and started a politics aimed at “saving 
the nations”. The new Croatian constitution of 1990 recognised the Croats as the only 
titular nation and treated the former fellow nation, the Serbs, as a national minority 
and did not allow them (either) to establish an ethnic based territorial autonomy.65 
The outraged Croatian Serbs, manipulated by Serbia, after their referendum on the 
issue of autonomy on 30 September 1990, proclaimed the Serbian Autonomous Oblast 
of Krajina (SAO Krajina) with its seat in Knin, within the territory of Croatia, belong-
ing in those days to Yugoslavia. Along with the escalation of the Serbo-Croatian conflict 
into a war, the Serbs proclaimed their independence from Croatia and joined Serbia on 
2 April 1991, and later on 19 December they proclaimed the independent Republic 
of Serbian Krajina (RSK).66 The internationally unrecognised Serbian state formation 
encompassed more than a quarter (approximately 15,000 square kilometres) of the ter-
ritory of Croatia including not only Krajina in a narrower sense (North Dalmatia, Lika, 
Kordun, Banovina/Banija having a Serbian majority population until then), but also 
certain western parts of Slavonia and areas along the Danube in Croatia (Baranya, West 
Srijem/Srem).67 (Figure 8)68
64  Weilguni, W., Suppan, A., Heuberger, V. and Koch, K.: Die Wahlen des Jahres 1990 in Mittel-, Ost- und 
Südosteuropa. In Atlas Ost- und Südosteuropa 6.1-G.3. Wien: ÖOSI. 1991.
65  Silber, L. and Little, A.: The death of Yugoslavia. London: Penguin Books – BBC Books. 1995.
66  Dakić, M.: The Serbian Krayina. Historical Roots and Its Birth. Knin: Iskra 1994.
67  Baletić, Z., Esterajher, J., Jajčinović, M., Klemenčić, M., Milardović, A., Nikić, G. and Višnar, F.: Kroatien zwischen 
Aggression und Frieden. Zagreb: AGM. 1994.
68  Fig. 8. Ethnic Map of Pannonian areas of Croatia and the front lines (1991). – 1–5= Parts of the „Republic of 
Serbian Krajina”.
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As late as at the end of 1992, Croatia offered the Krajina Serbs the status of territo-
rial autonomy (expanding to the districts/kotars of Glina and Knin), however, since by 
then the Serbs had this territory in their possession, they did not find this status satis-
factory. The Croatian-Serbian frontline remained basically fixed until the beginning of 
May 1995, when the Croatian army first reoccupied the Okučani area in West Slavonia, 
then between 4 and 8 August the areas of North Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun and Banovina 
(Banija), from where more than 200,000 Serbs fled to Serbia, a small proportion of 
whom settled down in Baranya, East Slavonia and in West Srijem (that remained under 
UNO-Serbian control until 1998).69 This put an end to the existence of the RSK and 
the ethnic area of the Croatian Serbs became completely decomposed because of the 
forced mass emigrations and thus their hope for a prospective ethnic based territorial 
autonomy diminished.
The Milošević regime in Serbia attempted to compensate the fact that it reduced 
the federal autonomies to have mere nominal statuses by “deconcentrating” the state 
power in a way that in 1991 districts (okrug) governed by leaders appointed by the 
prime minister were created.70 There were seven “okrugs” (districts directed from Bel-
grade) established in Vojvodina in a way that the Hungarian ethnic territory near the 
Tisza was subdivided into three parts (annexed to the districts of Novi Sad, Subotica 
69  Due to migration and assimilation, the proportion of the Serbian population in Croatia dropped from 581,663 
(12.2%) in 1991 to 186,633 (4.4%) in 2011.
70  Jordan, P.: Verwaltungsgliederung Mittel- und Südosteuropas 2007. In Atlas Ost- und Südosteuropa 5.4-G.10. 
Wien: ISR ÖAW. 2010.
Fig. 8. Ethnic Map of Pannonian areas of Croatia and the front lines (1991). – 1–5= Parts of the „Republic of 
Serbian Krajina”
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and Kikinda). Incidentally, the same method was applied also with the ethnic area of 
the Muslims and Bosniaks in the Sanjak region. After the loss of Kosovo and the fall of 
Milošević, the Serbian governments gradually started to restore Vojvodina’s autonomy 
that had been lost after 1988. The constitution of Vojvodina that has six official lan-
guages was enacted on 1 January 2010 and has been effective up to this day. Restoring 
the autonomy of the province that had a 2/3 Serbian majority following the 1995 mass 
Serbian influx also served though the interests of the Vojvodina Hungarians, who (the 
Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians, VMDK), nevertheless, had created a 
three-level self-governance model71 that includes the ethnic based territorial autonomy 
in 1992.72
The Hungarian parties forming an electoral coalition continue to have as their aim 
to create – along with the personal self-government – a regional self-governance for 
the eight Hungarian-majority municipalities (opština) near the Tisza (Hungarian Au-
tonomous District).73 This prospective autonomous district, that would comprise al-
most 60% of the Vojvodina Hungarians, would have 327 thousand inhabitants, out of 
which 53% would be Hungarians, 24.4% Serbs, 5.5% Bunjevci and Croats and 8% of 
unknown ethnicity (2002). The territorial autonomy has not yet been established, but 
a wide-scope cultural (personal) autonomy was created by the Vojvodina Hungarians 
mainly owing to the work of the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ).74
After the fall of communism the populous Hungarian minority communities estab-
lished their independent (cultural and political) organisations not only in multi-ethnic 
Yugoslavia, but also on the territories of states considering themselves to be unitary 
nation-states, such as the present-day Ukraine, Slovakia and Romania. These organisa-
tions articulated their various self-governance and autonomy concepts almost immedi-
ately.75
Transcarpathia was still a part of the Soviet Union, when in 1989 the Hungarian 
Cultural Federation in Transcarpathia (KMKSZ) expressed its commitment to creat-
71  According to the „Memorandum on the self-government of Hungarians living in the Republic of Serbia” worded 
at the congress of the VMDK in Kanjiža (Magyarkanizsa) (25 April 1992): 1. Personal self-government (with the 
Hungarian National Council as its executive body), 2. Territorial self-governance (partnership of the Hungarian-
majority municipalities/opština: Hungarian Autonomous District), 3. Local self-government (self-government for 
the representation of Hungarian-majority settlements outside the ethnic bloc).
72  Gerencsér, B. and Juhász, A.: A kisebbségi autonómia. Működő modellek, magyar elképzelések (The minority 
autonomy. Operating models, Hungarian conceptions). Budapest. 2001., Surányi, Z.: „Mindannyian akarjuk, de...” 
Autonómiaviták a Vajdaságban (All of us want, but... Debates on autonomy in Vojvodina). Beszélő 6. (9) 2001. 
http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/%E2%80%9Emindannyian-akarjuk-de%E2%80%9D
73  Surányi, Z.: „Mindannyian akarjuk, de...” Autonómiaviták a Vajdaságban, op. cit., Gábrity Molnár, I.: Kisebbségi 
autonómia-törekvések a Vajdaságban (Autonomy aspirations of minorities in Vojvodina). In Kupa, L. (ed.): 
Kisebbségi autonómia-törekvések Közép-Európában – a múltban és a jelenben. Pécs: PTE – Bookmaster Kft. 2009. 
74  Gábrity Molnár, I. 2009. Kisebbségi autonómia-törekvések a Vajdaságban, op. cit., Korhecz, T.: Otthonteremtőben 
a szülőföldön (Making home in the motherland). Novi Sad: Fórum. 2009., Korhecz, T.: Magyar autonómia 
Szerbiában. A programcéltól a hatályos törvényig (Hungarian autonomy in Serbia. From the political goal until the 
existing law). Pro Minoritate 2010. Spring, 67–73.
75  Ríz, Á.: Az 1990 után született autonómia-koncepciók összehasonlítása (Comparison of the autonomy concepts of 
the period 1990–2000). Korunk 2000. 3. XI. (2): 81–86. 
107Historical predecessors and current geographical possibilities
ing a Hungarian autonomous district with its seat in Berehovo (Beregszász).76 At the 
same time, the autochthonous Slavic population of the region, the Rusyns77 (to be more 
precise, the Society of Carpathian Rusyns), whose independent national existence was 
eliminated under the Soviet supremacy, started their seemingly hopeless struggle for 
the restoration of the autonomy that Transcarpathia (Carpatho-Ukraine) had enjoyed 
in 1938–39, and this evoked extremely heated debates even locally. At the referendum 
held on 1 December 1991 primarily on the issue of Ukraine’s independence, the vast 
majority of the local population in Transcarpathia supported the special self-govern-
ance status of the region (78%), and, moreover, the foundation of the Hungarian Au-
tonomous District in the Rayon of Berehovo (Beregszász) (81.4%). All this, however, 
had no political consequence, since Kiev (pressurized by nationalist forces) sternly re-
jected both endeavours.78
The unity of the young Ukrainian nation state was declared by its constitution en-
acted on 28 June 1996, which was forced to acknowledge the existence of only the Au-
tonomous Republic of Crimea (Krym) due to Russian pressure. Because of Ukraine’s 
rejection of the ethnic based territorial autonomy, starting from 2000 KMKSZ has 
initiated the formation of a Rayon of Tisza-region (Tisza-melléki járás) with its seat 
in Berehovo (Beregszász), where the Hungarians would constitute the majority of the 
population (72%) in a way that it would also include three quarters of the Transcar-
pathian Hungarians. Only a prospective future Ukrainian administrative reform would 
potentially allow for the changing of the district borders that had been marked in the 
Soviet period and that have been unaltered in the past half a century, and even then 
on the condition that the ethnic perspectives are observed from a point of view that is 
favourable for Hungarians.
The Hungarian parties in Slovakia proposed several autonomy concepts and drafts 
in the 1990s; the earliest (in 1991) and most articulated claim for a territorial autono-
my was expressed by the Coexistence-Együttélés Political Movement. These endeavours 
reached their summit and were devoted a wide scope national publicity at the Congress 
of Komárno (Komárom) of the Hungarian members of Slovakian parliament and of the 
Hungarian mayors of Slovakia (8 January 1994).79 The territorial autonomy draft pre-
sented and approved depicted two scenarios (one contiguous or three Hungarian-ma-
76  Botlik, J. and Dupka, Gy.: Magyarlakta települések ezredéve Kárpátalján (Millennium of the Hungarian-populated 
settlements in Subcarpathia). Ungvár–Budapest: Intermix. 1993.
77  At the 2001 census only 0.8% of the Transcarpathian population (10,090 people) declared Rusyn ethnicity (in 
1941 58.9%, 502 thousand Rusyn mother tongue).
78  Osztapec, J.: Politikai folyamatok Kárpátalján (1991–2009) (Political processes in Transcarpathia, 1991–2009). In 
Fedinec, Cs. and Vehes, M. (eds.): Kárpátalja 1919–2009 történelem, politika, kultúra. Budapest: Argumentum – 
MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézete, 2010. 377–392.
79  Az önkormányzat az önrendelkezés alapja. A szlovákiai magyar választott képviselők és polgármesterek országos 
nagygyűlésének hiteles jegyzőkönyve (Self-government is the basis of the self-determination. Minutes of the 
general assembly of the elected Hungarian members of the Slovakian parliament and of the Hungarian mayors of 
Slovakia). Komárom, 8 January 1994. Komárno/Komárom: Komáromi Lapok – Szinnyei Kiadó., Gerencsér, B. and 
Juhász, A.: A kisebbségi autonómia. Működő modellek, magyar elképzelések, op. cit., Molnár, M.: Felvidéki magyar 
autonómia-törekvések, op.cit.
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jority regions). Had the first scenario been realised, it would have resulted in creating 
a region of 8,245.3 square kilometres, adjacent to the Hungarian–Slovakian borders, 
with approximately 824 thousand (61.5% Hungarian) inhabitants.80 
The second scenario, as presented above, would have resulted in three Hungari-
an-majority regions: 1. In the west between Bratislava (Pozsony) and Šahy (Ipolyság) 
(525 thousand people, 63.1% Hungarian), 2. In the middle, between Šahy (Ipolyság) 
and Košice (Kassa) (239 thousand people, 54.2% Hungarian), 3. In the east (59 thou-
sand people, 77.3% Hungarian). Both the Slovak politics and wide masses of the Slovak 
society reacted with plain rejection, sometimes even almost hysterically to the Hungari-
an plans concerning an ethnic based territorial autonomy and administrative reform.81.
Among the Slovaks (partly similarly to the Rusyns and Ukrainians), who had been 
fighting for their autonomy and independence under the Hungarian and the Czech 
supremacy for more than a century, the word “autonomy” meaning the endeavour to 
achieve an internal territorial self-governance, equals with the first milestone on the 
way to independence, an overt civic disloyalty and secessionism. Therefore, it did not 
come as a surprise that the Slovak Parliament in its Act 221/1996 “On Territorial and 
Administrative Division“ enacted such – still effective – administrative order which 
represents the exact opposite of the conceptions of the Hungarian parties. The new 
region (kraj) and district (okres) borders completely partitioned the Hungarian ethnic 
area in South Slovakia in a way that Hungarians were in minority in almost all medium- 
and higher-level administrative units so that the Hungarians’ endeavours to achieve 
territorial self-governance would be prevented.82
The Party of the Hungarian Coalition (MKP), that became a government party in 
1998, gave up the idea of the ethnic based territorial autonomy under these new circum-
stances as a result of political negotiations, although initially it strove to reconsider the 
law of public administration referred to above. As opposed to the Coexistence-Együt-
télés draft mentioned above, they made vast allowances proposing the creation of a 
western region called “Podunajsko/Dunamente (or Komárno/Komárom)” with 602 
thousand inhabitants comprising a 55.2% Hungarian majority between Šamorín (So-
80  Oriskó, N.: Magyarok által lakott községek és városok Szlovákiában (Communes and towns inhabited by Hungarians 
in Slovakia). Bratislava: Együttélés-Coexistence. 1993., Duray, M., Kvarda, J. and Oriskó, N.: A nemzetállam és 
demokratikus ellenszere (The nation-state and its democratic remedy). Pozsony/Bratislava: Együttélés-Spolužitie, 
1994., Kocsis, K.: A közigazgatási térfelosztás változásai a mai Szlovákia területén a XX. században, op. cit.
81  Bakker, E.: Minority conflicts in Slovakia and Hungary? Capelle a/d Ijssel: Labyrint Publication. 1997., Fazekas, 
M.: Délvidéki és felvidéki autonómia a XX. század utolsó évtizedében. Lehetőség vagy ábránd? (Autonomy in 
Vojvodina and Slovakia in the last decade of the 20th century. Possibility or illusion?). In Kupa, L. (ed.): Kisebbségi 
autonómia-törekvések Közép-Európában – a múltban és a jelenben. Pécs: PTE–Bookmaster Kft., 2009. 163–169.
82  Kocsis, K. 2002. A közigazgatási térfelosztás változásai a mai Szlovákia területén a XX. században, op. cit., 
Hamberger, J.: A magyar kisebbség jogi-politikai helyzete Szlovákiában 1989 novembere után (Legal and political 
situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia following November 1989). In Bárdi, N., Fedinec, Cs. and Szarka, 
L. (eds): Kisebbségi magyar közösségek a 20. században. Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó – MTA Kisebbségkutató 
Intézet, 2008. 340–345., Szarka, L.: Útkeresés, önszerveződés a rendszerváltás éveiben (1989–1991) (Seeking 
ways and means, self-organisation in the period of 1989–1991). In Bárdi, N., Fedinec, Cs. and Szarka, L. (eds): 
Kisebbségi magyar közösségek a 20. században. Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó – MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2008. 
320–329.
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morja) and Šahy (Ipolyság). The plan of this Hungarian majority region was consid-
ered “professionally unfounded” and “endangering the territorial integrity of the Slovak 
nation state”, thus it was sternly rejected by the Slovak government (as well as by the 
nationalist parties of the opposition). Since then the apparently hopeless issue of the 
Hungarian territorial autonomy has receded in the Hungarian parties’ politics, and the 
initiative was taken over by civil motions (Comorra Aula).
The largest Hungarian community beyond the borders of Hungary, with more than 
1.6 million Transylvanian Hungarians at the time, founded a unified organisation for 
protecting their interests, called the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania 
(RMDSZ) at the end of the Romanian revolution, on 25 December 1989. By 1992 
within this multi-faceted movement, a political stream articulately requesting Romania 
to grant minority rights, overtly demanding autonomy and relying on favourable effects 
of exercising pressure from abroad came into prominence, which was also reflected in 
requesting a fellow nation status for the Hungarians in Romania, as well as requesting 
autonomy and a minority law.83 This was when the first three-step autonomy models 
were drafted, which included the demand for a territorial autonomy (the “Region of the 
Hungarian National Community” based on the free partnership of the local Hungari-
an-majority self-governments).84
By 1996, there were two wings within the RMDSZ, that in the meantime became a 
governing party: the “moderate” wing considered the process of arriving at an autono-
my to be a longer one, as opposed to the “more radical” (“autonomist”) wing. By 2003, 
the inner conflicts between the two wings led to the foundation of the civil organisa-
tion Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (EMNT), and with a similar goal, 
but primarily with the Székely Land in focus, the „Székely National Council (SZNT) 
by the prominent figures of the “more radical” wing.85 The statute of the autonomy of 
the Székely Land elaborated on in 2003 by the SZNT was emphatically rejected by the 
Romanian Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The modified bill on the autonomy of 
the Székely Land was introduced in 2005, by the RMDSZ, as a member of the govern-
ment, but it was rejected by the Romanian Chamber of Deputies after a few months, 
and by the Senate on 25 September 2012. The bill proposed the „Székely Land Auton-
omous Region” to be a region encompassing 9,980 square kilometres, with a total pop-
83  Bárdi, N.: A romániai magyar kisebbség helyzetének változásai, társadalmi, kulturális önszerveződésének 
eredményei (Changes of the situation, results of the social, cultural self-organisation of the Hungarian minority in 
Romania). In Bárdi, N., Fedinec, Cs. and Szarka, L. (eds): Kisebbségi magyar közösségek a 20. században. Budapest: 
Gondolat Kiadó – MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2008. 330–339.
84  Csapó, I. J.: 2.2. Memorandum Tervezet A Romániai Magyar Nemzeti Közösség Belső Önrendelkezéséről, 
1992 (Memorandum plan on the Internal Self-determination of the Hungarian National Community in 
Romania, 1992). In Csapó, I. J. (ed): Autonómiák és autonómia törekvések, 2003. 262–274., Gerencsér, B. and 
Juhász, A.: A kisebbségi autonómia. Működő modellek, magyar elképzelések, op. cit., Bognár, Z. (ed.): Romániai 
autonómia-elképzelések 1989 után (Autonomy conceptions in Romania following 1989). www.adatbank.ro/belso.
php?alk=48&k=5
85  The MNT, fighting for the territorial autonomy overtly and striving to reach results quickly was founded on 25 
April 2003 in Odorheiu Secuiesc (Székelyudvarhely), while the SZNT was founded on 16 October 2003 in Sfântu 
Gheorghe (Sepsiszentgyörgy). Former members of the RMDSZ founded the Hungarian Civic Party in 2008 and 
the Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania in 2011.
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ulation of 809 thousand of which 76% Hungarians. The planned autonomous region 
would primarily have included the today’s counties of Harghita (Hargita) and Covasna 
(Kovászna) and the south-eastern part of Mureş (Maros) county. 
It is a little-known fact in connection with the autonomy struggles of the Transylva-
nian Hungarians that the EMNT supported the elaboration of a plan of a Hungarian 
autonomous region in Northwest Romania (Partium region).86 There have been several 
plans prepared for the region inhabited by a Hungarian–Romanian mixed population 
adjacent to the Hungarian border that has been considered by Romanians as a potential 
irredentist danger. The plan encompassing the largest territory would accommodate 
349 thousand people (191 thousand, 54.5% Hungarian and 130 thousand, 37.1% Ro-
manian) and would also include the city Satu Mare (Szatmárnémeti) and towns Carei 
(Nagykároly), Şimleu Silvaniei (Szilágysomlyó) and Marghita (Margitta). This plan has 
not become known by the Romanian public. For the time being, the Hungarians in 
Northwest Romania are getting accustomed to the idea that they might achieve a terri-
torial autonomy on their homeland. 
As a consequence of the series of failures regarding plans on territorial autonomy, 
the RMDSZ proposed the creation of a region uniting the counties Mureş (Maros), 
Harghita (Hargita) and Covasna (Kovászna) by restructuring the development regions 
planned in 1998 before the 2007 EU elections.87 This proposal for restructuring the 
administration of Romania was kept up until the negotiations with the president’s com-
mittee of professional experts in 2010 (15 regions, one of them with a Hungarian ma-
jority).
Based on the failures of the autonomy struggles of the Hungarian minorities in Ro-
mania, Slovakia and Ukraine, it can be argued that both the titular nations and the Hun-
garian parties should change their approach. The Romanian, Slovakian and Ukrainian 
decision-makers should see the reasons and understand that a territorial autonomy 
is not an attack on sovereignty and does not necessarily lead to a separation, but, on 
the contrary, if it operates successfully, it can be a form of integration and an effective 
means of overcoming conflicts. Simultaneously Hungarian minority politicians, who 
are at the moment seriously divided, should realise that autonomy is not a magic potion 
and it cannot be reached by unilateral declarations, but there should be (among others) 
a unity of action towards the titular nations, and at the same time, an atmosphere of 
trust has to be created, and all this takes a long time, patience and political wisdom.88
86  Szilágyi, F. and Csomortányi, I.: Önrendelkezés a Partiumban (Autonomy in North-west Romania). Oradea 
(Nagyvárad): Partium Kiadó. 2010.
87  Csutak, I.: Új? Régi? Jó? (New? Old? Good Regions?) Csíkszereda: Alutus. 2007., Szilágyi, F.: Az új román területi 
közigazgatás lehetséges elvi alapjai (Possible fundamental principles of the new Romanian territorial-administrative 
division). Magyar Kisebbség 2010. New Sery XV. (3–4) (57–58): 225–246.
88  Salat, L.: Autonómiák évadja Erdélyben (Season of the autonomies in Transylvania). Krónika VI. 6. Jan. 10–11, 
2004. 
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The current geographical possibilities of ethnic based territorial autonomies 
in the Carpathian Basin
Beyond the necessary political conditions, historical traditions and lucky circumstanc-
es,89 some ethnic and geographical-demographical conditions, as proposed above, need 
to be met (the minority should outnumber the titular state majority; the settlement area 
should be relatively contiguous and large enough as well as economically sustainable) 
in order to reach ethnic based territorial autonomies (or at least regional associations of 
local self-governments with the minority in majority). These latter conditions are only 
met in the ethnic territories of the Hungarians in Slovakia, Transcarpathia, Transylvania 
and Vojvodina mentioned in the previous chapter (Figure 9).90 Although a century ago 
there used to be several hundred thousand German and Serbian minority inhabitants in 
the Carpathian Basin, due to the forced emigrations (for the Germans 1944–50 and the 
Serbs 1991–95), the territorial autonomy is no longer accomplishable for them.
89  See Ghai, Y. (ed.): Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 2002.
90  Fig. 9. Geographically possible ethnic based territorial autonomies in the Carpatho-Pannonian area. – 1 = 
Bosniaks, Muslims by ethnicity; 2 = Croats, Bunjevci, Šokci; 3 = Czechs; 4 = Germans, German speaking 
Austrians; 5 = Hungarians; 6 = Poles; 7 = Romanians; 8 = Romani people; 9 = Serbs; 10 = Slovaks; 11 = Slovenes; 
12 = Ukrainians; 13 = Other ethnic groups
Fig. 9. Geographically possible ethnic based territorial autonomies in the Carpatho-Pannonian area. – 1 
= Bosniaks, Muslims by ethnicity; 2 = Croats, Bunjevci, Šokci; 3 = Czechs; 4 = Germans, German speaking 
Austrians; 5 = Hungarians; 6 = Poles; 7 = Romanians; 8 = Romani people; 9 = Serbs; 10 = Slovaks; 11 = Slovenes; 
12 = Ukrainians; 13 = Other ethnic groups
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During the last century on today’s territory of Slovakia, the number and the pro-
portion of people declaring Hungarian ethnicity (or mother tongue) has continuously 
decreased due to the forced migrations, assimilation processes and the anti-Hungarian 
climate of opinion connected to the building of the Czechoslovak (then, from 1993 the 
Slovak) nation state.91 In spite of this, the vast majority of the Hungarians still consti-
tute a more or less contiguous settlement area in the southern regions of the country, 
near the Hungarian border, where there was a native Hungarian-speaking majority in 
414 towns and villages in 2011. Since the conspicuously anti-Hungarian administra-
tive reforms (1960, 1996), only two (Komárno and Dunajská Streda) of the present 
79 districts of Slovakia retained their Hungarian majority. Should natural hinterlands 
(catchment areas), historical traditions and ethnic relations be considered, there could 
be 16 districts created in Slovakia with a Hungarian-speaking majority population.92 
(Figure 10).93 
All the seats of these possible districts used to be district or county seats 
in the past century.94 Out of the districts lining up near the Slovakian–
91  Hungarians on the present-day territory of Slovakia (m: mother tongue; e: ethnicity): in 1910 880,851 (m), in 
1930 585,434 (e), in 1991 567,296 (e), in 2011 458,467 (e).
92  Michniak, D.: Zázemia vybraných centier dochádzky do zamestnania v roku 2001 (Hinterlands of selected 
commuting centres, 2001). In Atlas obyvateľstva Slovenska. Bratislava: Univerzita Komenského. 2006., Halás, M. 
and Klapka, P.: Contribution to regional division of Slovakia based on the application of Reilly’s model. Hungarian 
Geographical Bulletin 2012. 61. (3): 237–255. 
93  Fig. 10. Ratio of the Hungarians on the territory of the geographically possible Autonomous Region of South 
Slovakia (1941, 2011)
94  Kocsis, K.: A közigazgatási térfelosztás változásai a mai Szlovákia területén a XX. században, op. cit.
Fig. 10. Ratio of the Hungarians on the territory of the geographically possible Autonomous Region 
of South Slovakia (1941, 2011)
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Hungarian border, 9 in the west, 5 in the middle and 2 in the east could constitute an 
association (“Autonomous Region of South Slovakia”), the total population of which 
would exceed 680 thousand; according to the mother tongue 63.5% (432 thousand) 
would be Hungarian, 27.9% (190 thousand) Slovak, and 1.6% (11 thousand) Roma 
(Table 1). 
Table 1. Ethnic structure of the population on the territory of the possible 
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Sources: Mother tongue data of the Hungarian (1941) and Slovakian (2001, 2011) popula-
tion censuses. 
Only 15% of the Hungarians would remain outside this imaginary region, the ma-
jority of whom live in Bratislava and in the towns of the Slovakian–Hungarian lin-
guistic boundary that used to have a Hungarian majority until 1945, and since then 
predominantly a Slovakian majority (Senec, Šaľa, Levice, Lučenec, Košice).
In spite of the emigrations in the past half century, the number of Hungarians in 
Transcarpathia (Ukraine) has not decreased dramatically (1959: 146 thousand, 1979: 
158 thousand, 2001: 152 thousand). Out of the 13 rayons of the region there is a Hun-
garian majority in the rayon of Berehovo (Beregszász) only, constituted by (including 
the town of Berehovo/Beregszász) a mere 35.6% of the Transcarpathian Hungarians. It 
would be necessary to reconsider the district borders that had been unchanged for the 
past 60 years in a way that natural hinterlands and ethnic scenes are considered; thus in 
the ethnic territory of the Hungarian minority adjacent to the Hungarian–Ukrainian 
border it would be reasonable to detach a rayon of Čop (Csap) with 49 thousand inhab-
itants from the actual district of Uzhhorod (Ungvár), and a rayon of Vylok (Tiszaújlak) 
with 38 thousand inhabitants from today’s rayon of Vynohradiv (Nagyszőlős) (Figure 
11)95.96 The three new districts formed this way would have an absolute Hungarian 
majority and they could join to create an association (“Autonomous District of Tisza 
Region”, Prytysianska), the total population of which would exceed 165 thousand, with 
95  Fig. 11. Ratio of the Hungarians on the territory of the geographically possible Autonomous District of Tisza 
Region (Prytysianska) in Ukraine (1941, 2001).
96  The number of inhabitants in these imagined rayons would exceed the population number of today’s rayons of 
Velykyy Bereznyi, Perechyn and Volovets. The new rayons created this way along the Hungarian–Ukrainian border 
would be: rayon of Čop (Csap) (48,907 inhabitants, 63.7% Hungarian, 27.1% Ukrainian); rayon of Berehovo 
(Beregszász) (79,553 inhabitants, 69.4% Hungarian, 23.3% Ukrainian); rayon of Vylok (Tiszaújlak) (37,531 
inhabitants, 71.4% Hungarian, 28.1% Ukrainian).
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68.2% of Hungarian, 25.5% of Ukrainian, 3.9% of Roma and 1.7% of Russian ethnicity 
(Table 2). 
Table 2. Ethnic structure of the population on the territory of the possible 


























































Sources: Mother tongue (1941) and ethnicity (1989, 2001) data of the Hungarian (1941), 
Soviet (1989) and Ukrainian (2001) population censuses.
Only one quarter of the Transcarpathian Hungarians would remain outside these 
rayons, especially in the towns near the Hungarian–Ukrainian linguistic boundary 
(Uzhhorod, Mukačevo, Vynohradiv) and in the Upper Tisza Valley.
Fig. 11. Ratio of the Hungarians on the territory of the geographically possible Autonomous District of 
Tisza Region (Prytysianska) in Ukraine (1941, 2001)
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Almost all the Hungarians of Romania lived on the territories belonging to Hungary 
until 1918, in Transylvania in the broader sense, where their number rapidly decreased 
in the past almost four decades – primarily because of the accelerated rate of emigra-
tion (1977: 1.7 million, 2002: 1.4 million and 2011: 1.2 million ethnic Hungarians). 
Presently approximately half of the Transylvanian Hungarians live in the Székely Land, 
almost one fifth live in Northwest Romania (Partium or Crişana-Maramureş), while 
one third struggles for ethnic survival in enclaves, diasporas. Since the administrative 
reform of 1968, out of the 16 counties of Transylvania only two, Harghita and Covas-
na, had a Hungarian majority. 
In 2011 out of the present 1,192 Transylvanian cities, towns and communes 214 had a 
Hungarian majority. From among the territories populated by minorities in the Carpathi-
an Basin a possibility of an ethnic based territorial self-governance seems to be the most ob-
vious in the Transylvanian Székely Land if we consider the ethnic, economic and historical 
background. The Hungarian (Székely) population living there enjoyed territorial autono-
my from the 14th century until 1876 (and from 1952 to 1960/68). The dominantly Hun-
garian ethnic nature of the historic-ethnic region called Székely Land has remained intact 
from the 13th century up to recently. Without changing the boundaries of the municipal-
ities, communes, reconsidering the catchment areas, the ethnic structure and the historical 
background, it would be possible to join the Hungarian-majority towns and communes of 
the counties of Harghita, Covasna and Mureş to create a self-governance region (“Autono-
mous Region of Székely Land”), which would be home to 750 thousand (76.5% Hungari-
an-speaking and 21.5% Romanian-speaking) inhabitants (Figure 1297, Table 3).
Table 3. Ethnic structure of the population on the territory of the possible 
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Sources: Mother tongue data of the Hungarian (1941) and Romanian (2002, 2011) popula-
tion censuses.
As opposed to the historical Székely seats (Székely Land) existing until 1876, this 
territory would not include the Romanian-majority areas of Buzău and Becaş, Topliţa 
and its environs, while the adjacent Hungarian-majority communes (outside the histor-
ical Székely Land) could be incorporated. 
97  Fig. 12. Ratio of the Hungarians on the territory of the geographically possible Autonomous Region of Székely 
Land (1941, 2011)
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In the north-western part of Romania, in the so called Partium (Crişana-Mara-
mureş) region, on the territories of the counties of Bihor, Satu Mare and Sălaj, an asso-
ciation of 86 (mostly Hungarian majority) towns and communes (“Autonomous Dis-
trict of Partium”) would be conceivable based on the catchment area of towns and the 
prevailing ethnic pattern, where 430 thousand (56% Hungarian-speaking, 41.1% Ro-
manian-speaking and 1.9% Roma-speaking) inhabitants could enjoy a territory based 
self-governance (Figure 1398, Table 4).
This region would approximately coincide with the joint territory of the elector-
al districts of Chamber of Deputies in which a Hungarian party (RMDSZ) won the 
majority of the votes on 9 December 2012. One third of the Transylvanian Hungar-
ians would remain outside the above mentioned territories, mainly in cities (e.g. in 
Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár 49 thousand, Oradea/Nagyvárad 46 thousand, Braşov/Brassó 
16 thousand, Timişoara/Temesvár 15 thousand, Baia Mare/Nagybánya 14 thousand) 
and in the Transylvanian basin, where an autonomy based on a local and personal prin-
ciple could help preserve their ethnic identity. 
98  Fig. 13. Ratio of the Hungarians on the territory of the geographically possible Autonomous District of Northwest 
Romania (Partium) (1941, 2011)
Fig. 12. Ratio of the Hungarians on the territory of the geographically possible Autonomous Region of 
Székely Land (1941, 2011)
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Table 4.  Ethnic structure of the population on the territory of the possible 
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Sources: Mother tongue data of the Hungarian (1941) and Romanian (2002, 2011) popula-
tion censuses.
Almost all the Hungarians of Serbia (251 thousand people) live on the territory 
of the Vojvodina Autonomous Province, where they are in majority in eight munici-
palities. These administrative units, located near the Hungarian–Serbian border and 
the Tisa, in the hinterland of the cities of Subotica/Szabadka and Senta/Zenta, could 
voluntarily join to form an “Autonomous District of North Bačka” with 301 inhabit-
Fig. 13. Ratio of the Hungarians on the territory of the geographically possible Autonomous District of 
Northwest Romania (Partium) (1941, 2011)
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ants, 50.4% of whom would be Hungarians, 25.8% Serbs and 9.5% Bunjevci and Croats 
(Figure 1499, Table 5).
Table 5. Ethnic structure of the population on the territory of the possible 












































Sources: Mother tongue (1941) and ethnicity (2002, 2011) data of the Hungarian (1941) 
and Serbian (2002, 2011) population censuses.
99  Fig. 14. Ratio of the Hungarians on the territory of the geographically possible Autonomous District of North 
Bačka (Potisje) (1941, 2011)
Fig. 14. Ratio of the Hungarians on the territory of the geographically possible Autonomous District of 
North Bačka (Potisje) (1941, 2011)
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Although 40% of the Vojvodina Hungarians (100 thousand people) would remain 
outside this territory, their already existing cultural autonomy (based on a personal 
principle) and their national minority self-government organisation, the National 
Council of the Vojvodina Hungarians would continue to support the preservation of 
their national identity.
Conclusion
The territorial autonomies as the most effective tools of minority protection and the most 
modern forms of internal self-governance of minorities that have been created in the past 
decades one after the other, all over the world, do not count as novelties on the historical 
territory of Hungary, in the Carpathian Basin. The Hungarian rulers granted such ter-
ritorial self-governance in exchange for military service to different ethnic groups (e.g. 
Saxons, Székelys, Romanians, Cumans, Jassic people and Serbs) from the 13th century, 
the majority of which remained in existence until the second half of the 19th century. 
By the end of the 18th century, the birth of the modern nations and nationalism and 
by Joseph II’s Germanizing enlightened absolutism, the proportion of ethnic minorities 
reached 2/3 of the country’s population (while until the end of the 15th century only 
one third of inhabitants were non-Hungarians) due to reasons related to demographic 
processes and wars that were basically reshaping the ethnic structure of the country 
from the end of the Middle Ages. Due to the increasing growth of their demograph-
ic weight, their political consciousness and their nationalism brought partly about by 
the Hungarian nationalism (but also further provoked by the Habsburg Empire), the 
national minorities started to claim the recognition and implementation of their ex-
istence as independent political nations and their ethnic based territorial autonomies 
more and more articulated from the middle of the 19th century.
The Hungarian state, following the Austro–Hungarian Compromise (1867), was 
granted internal self-governance within the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy, howev-
er, Hungary denied the same right from the national minorities (except for the Cro-
ats) living on its territory. The reason for this denial was the same as in the case of all 
other countries aiming to build an ethnically-politically unitary nation state: a fear of 
attempts of the minorities to separate, a fear that the territorial integrity of the state 
should be infringed and that the state borders that were hope to remain ever-lasting 
should be changed. It is regrettable that the Hungarian state that used to excel at eth-
nic-linguistic tolerance from the times of St. Stephen until the 19th century, submitting 
to the spirit of the age and complying with the illusion of the French nation-state idea, 
made a mistake by denying (among others) the ethnic-territorial autonomy requests of 
the minorities, that resulted in the estrangement of the minorities followed by their 
separation after the first world war, and, as a final outcome, in the dissolution of the 
thousand-year-old Hungarian state. 
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At the end of 1918, on the territory of the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire new mul-
ti-ethnic, middle-sized “nation-states” were created, the borders of which had been 
drawn in a way that was disadvantageous for Hungary and thus several millions of 
Hungarians mainly in the border regions fell under their supremacy. In order to protect 
their territorial integrity the neighbours of Hungary did not only deny the autonomy 
requests of the Hungarian minorities treated as third-rate minorities, but also those of 
their “fellow-nations” (e.g. Slovaks, Rusyns, Croats) considered as second-rate minor-
ities.
In the period between 1938 and 1944, the Third Reich (in order to reach its con-
quering aims) made use of the desperation of the nations and minorities in the Car-
pathian Basin that were suppressed between the two world wars and it successfully 
applied the ancient Roman principle of “divide et impera”. It repelled the countries of 
the formerly ruling nations (Czechs, Romanians, Serbs) to their ethnic core areas with 
the new boundaries, “donated independence” to the Slovaks and Croats and allowed 
the Hungarians to unite their ethnic territory, that is approved of the re-annexation of 
the territories populated by Hungarians that were lost in 1919.
In the countries of the Carpathian Basin (except for Austria) that came under the 
influence (mainly military occupation) of the Soviet Union after the second world war, 
Soviet-type communist regimes were built, which made it impossible for the follow-
ing decades (in a general anti-minority atmosphere) to establish an actual territorial 
self-governance. The forced migrations between 1944 and 1950 already pointed in this 
direction, which basically transformed the ethnic structure of the region by removing 
the Germans almost entirely, weakening the Hungarian minorities and colonising main-
ly Slovaks, Ukrainians, Russians, Romanians and Serbs in great masses. In the decades 
of socialism only Vojvodina in Serbia (1945–1989) and the Hungarian Autonomous 
Region in Romania (under Soviet pressure, between 1952 and 1960–68) can be men-
tioned as examples of permanent and temporary territorial autonomies, respectively.
During the years of the Yugoslav wars, there was a short period of territorial autono-
my and independence in the case of the Serbian Krajina, which sank irrecoverably into 
history in 1995. After the years of the political transition, the significant Hungarian 
minorities of the Carpathian Basin have elaborated on their autonomy concepts that 
typically consist of three steps. Within these frameworks they directly articulated and 
frequently submitted as bills their notion of territorial self-governance, which was im-
mediately (and in certain cases repeatedly) rejected by the Slovakian, Ukrainian, Ro-
manian and Serbian parties.
Because of the shocking effects of the socioeconomic systemic change (1990– ) and 
the world economic crisis (2008– ), the lack of welfare, the increasing social polarisa-
tion, the disappearance of the former strong central power, the lack of a democratic 
civil society, the existence of populous ethnic and national minorities and some bitter 
historical memories, the politics frequently turns to nationalism as a weapon in the 
countries of the Carpathian Basin. Nationalist powers frequently provoke minorities, 
especially if they are large in number and live on a relatively continuous ethnic territo-
ry in order to prove that minorities mean a (mostly irredentist) danger. As a result of 
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the economic and political difficulties, the governments in question make attempts at 
centralising the state functions rather than at devolution the power and they, especial-
ly, oppose establishing ethnic based territorial autonomies, which the titular nations 
conceive to be overt attacks on the territorial integrity of the state. In this respect the 
lessons learnt from unsuccessful examples (e.g. Kosovo, Abkhasia, Karabah) are empha-
sised over successful, positive European ones. 
The geographical and demographical conditions of an ethnic based territorial 
self-governance are available in the case of most of the settlements of Hungarian na-
tional communities in Slovakia, Transcarpathia, Transylvania (Székely Land and Par-
tium) and Vojvodina (North Bačka). It seems, however, that for the time being, due 
to the reasons outlined above, both short-term and medium-term political conditions 
are missing, even in the case of attempting to realise ethnic based associations of local 
self-governments (municipalities) of minorities.
